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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states
“[n]o person . . . shall be compelled . . . to be a witness against
1
himself.” It expresses the belief that a society “based on respect for
the individual, the determination of guilt or innocence by just
procedures, in which the accused made no unwilling contribution
2
to his conviction, [is] more important than punishing the guilty.”
It makes central to our country’s system of justice “[t]he principle
that a man is not obliged to furnish the State with ammunition to
3
use against him.” The State has the right to punish lawbreakers,
4
but it cannot compel self-incrimination. “A man may be punished,
even put to death, by the State; but . . . he should not be made to
5
prostrate himself before its majesty.”
Many states—including Minnesota—require convicted sex

1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment was incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
2. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 432 (1968).
3. Abe Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 J.
CLEV. B. ASS’N 91, 98 (1954).
4. Id. at 98-99.
5. Id. at 100.
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offenders to admit to their crimes as part of their sentence. This
creates a number of potential Fifth Amendment violations, the
most obvious being when an admission of guilt would destroy the
6
offender’s appeal. An admission may also give rise to a perjury
7
prosecution for an offender who testified at trial. Furthermore, an
offender risks prosecution by disclosing past offenses for which he
8
has not yet been prosecuted.
So how does one balance an offender’s Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination with society’s interest in rehabilitating sex
offenders before releasing them from prison? Courts throughout
9
the country have wrestled with this question, as have many authors
10
and scholars. There is much uncertainty surrounding the issue,
but one thing is sure: any means the State uses must comport with
the Constitution, for “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the
6. See, e.g., McComb v. State, 94 P.3d 715, 721 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev.
denied, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 830 (Kan. Dec. 14, 2004); State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur,
590 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Minn. 1999).
7. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 791; see also infra Part VII.B.
8. A fourth problem, but one that is beyond the scope of this Note, is the
issue of whether the State can deny a person the right to maintain their
innocence. The classic Fifth Amendment situation is when the person fears that
admissions may be used against them in a subsequent criminal proceeding. See
infra Part III.B. However, there is an argument to be made that the Fifth
Amendment recognizes the more fundamental right of a person to simply say,
regardless of whether they will be subject to criminal prosecution or not, “I’m not
guilty. I just didn’t do it.”
9. Compare Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966)
(determining that forcing a defendant to admit guilt or receive maximum
sentence violated Fifth Amendment because it imposed a judicial penalty on the
defendant), and Bankes v. Simmons, 963 P.2d 412 (Kan. 1998) (finding refusal to
issue good time credits due to prisoner’s statements made in therapy violated his
Fifth Amendment rights), and State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991)
(protecting convicted sex offender from making non-immunized selfincriminating statements), with Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.
1969) (permitting harsher sentence on an offender who would not admit his guilt
because public’s interest in rehabilitation outweighed the offender’s rights), and
McComb, 94 P.3d at 715 (finding no Fifth Amendment violation when State revokes
offender’s supervised release term for refusing to sign an acceptance of
responsibility form required under post-release treatment program).
10. See, e.g., Jessica Wilen Berg, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Silence: Taking a
Stand on Fifth Amendment Implications for Court-Ordered Therapy Programs, 79 CORNELL
L. REV. 700 (1994); Jonathan Kaden, Therapy for Convicted Sex Offenders: Pursuing
Rehabilitation Without Incrimination, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 347 (1998);
Brendan J. Shevlin, “Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea:” A Look at the Fifth
Amendment Implications of Probation Programs for Sex Offenders Requiring Mandatory
Admissions of Guilt, 88 KY. L.J. 485 (2000); Jamie Tanabe, Right Against SelfIncrimination v. Public Safety: Does Hawaii’s Sex Offender Treatment Program Violate the
Fifth Amendment?, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 825 (2001).
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11

Constitution and the prisons of this country.”
This Note looks at the issue as applied to Minnesota’s prisonbased sex offender treatment program (SOTP).
Minnesota
requires sex offenders to undergo treatment as part of their
12
sentences. A prerequisite of admission into a treatment program
is admitting responsibility for the offense and similar past
13
offenses. Convicted offenders who refuse to admit responsibility
are denied entry into treatment, resulting in an extension of their
14
supervised release date and more time spent in prison.
The Minnesota Supreme Court justifies this by reasoning that
supervised release is a benefit and prisoners have no liberty interest
15
in a supervised release date.
However, in a recent case not
involving a sex offender, the court ruled that Minnesota’s
sentencing statutes grant inmates a liberty interest in their
16
supervised release dates. This Note argues that, because of the
court’s new ruling, requiring sex offenders to admit their crimes
violates their right against self-incrimination.
This Note first discusses Minnesota’s SOTP and the state’s
17
sentencing statutes. Next, it provides a brief historical overview of
the Fifth Amendment, followed by case law that lays out the
18
modern right against self-incrimination. This Note then discusses
19
the pertinent Supreme Court cases, followed by Minnesota case
20
law relating to the sentencing of sex offenders. This Note argues
that Minnesota’s sentencing scheme—viewed in light of a recent
Minnesota Supreme Court decision—violates sex offenders’ rights
against self-incrimination when they are required to admit their
21
crimes in order to participate in therapy. This Note concludes by
proposing solutions to the problem that will properly balance
22
society’s interests with those of the sex offenders.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part V.A.3.
See infra Part V.C.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
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II. MINNESOTA LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING SEX OFFENDERS
A.

Minnesota’s Sex Offender Treatment Program

Research has shown that inmates who successfully complete a
SOTP are less likely to reoffend than those who quit or are
23
terminated from the program. A study that tracked sex offenders
over a nine-year period showed that only fourteen percent of the
offenders who successfully completed the treatment program were
24
rearrested for a new sex offense. This is in comparison to a rate of
twenty-one percent who received no treatment and thirty percent
25
who did not complete treatment. Sex offender recidivism rates
26
are typically high, but rates for offenders released from Minnesota
prisons have dropped fifty percent between the years of 1992 and
27
1999.
Given these statistics, Minnesota understandably grants judges
the power to mandate convicted sex offenders to undergo therapy
28
while incarcerated.
The Legislature has mandated that the
29
Commissioner of the Department of Corrections (DOC) provide
sex offender treatment for adults and juveniles committed to the
custody of the Commissioner and adult offenders for whom

23. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., PROGRAMS FOR SEX OFFENDERS 1 (2003),
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications/pdf/Sex%20Offender%20Programs.pd
f; see MARY ELLISON, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, OJP FACT SHEET 2 (2004),
http://www.ojp.state.mn.us/cj/publications/FS-2004-001_Sex_Offenders.pdf.
24. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 23, at 1.
25. Id.
26. ELLISON, supra note 23, at 1-2.
27. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 23, at 1.
28. Another method of treating sex offenders is through civil commitment
under Minnesota’s Sexually Psychopathic Personality Act, MINN. STAT. § 253B.02,
subd. 18b (2004), or the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, MINN. STAT. § 253B.02,
subd. 18c. Although the topics are related, civil commitment implicates a host of
different constitutional issues. This Note focuses on prison-based treatment
programs and does not discuss civil commitment. A number of other articles
provide an in-depth look at Minnesota’s civil commitment scheme. See, e.g., Eric S.
Janus, Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an Empirically-Based
Prevention Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1083 (2003); Warren J.
Maas, Erosion of Constitutional Rights in Commitment of Sex Offenders, 29 WM.
MITCHELL. L. REV. 1241 (2003); Anita Schlank & Rick Harry, Examining Our
Approaches to Sex Offenders and the Law: The Treatment of the Civilly Committed Sex
Offender in Minnesota: A Review of the Past Ten Years, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1221
(2003).
29. The Department of Corrections is under the control and supervision of
the Commissioner of Corrections. MINN. STAT. § 241.01, subd. 1.
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treatment is ordered as a condition of probation.
The
Commissioner is required to provide a range of sex offender
programs, including programs within the state adult correctional
31
facility system. The Commissioner is empowered to establish rules
and regulations for the treatment programs, and participation in
32
the program is subject to those rules. The Commissioner is not
required “to accept or retain an offender in a program if the
offender . . . refuses or fails to comply with the program’s
33
requirements.”
Offenders do not have a statutory right to
34
treatment.
Sex offenders entering one of the DOC facilities are
35
immediately assessed to determine their programming needs.
The DOC’s largest prison-based treatment facility, located in MCF–
Lino Lakes, houses 225 adult males and services approximately 400
36
offenders per year.
The offenders are assessed for thirty days
37
The goal of the
before being assigned to a therapeutic track.
program is “to help the offender reduce his risk of reoffending
through acceptance of responsibility for his problems; acquisition
of new information, cognitive and behavioral change; and
development of a reoffense prevention plan and a community re38
entry plan.”
Most treatment providers agree that acceptance of
responsibility is necessary for successful treatment and failure to do
39
so is a serious obstacle to rehabilitation. Offenders are required
to disclose all past offenses because development of an effective
30. Id. § 241.67, subd. 3-4.
31. Id. § 241.67, subd. 3(a).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 23, at 1. The programs available
include group therapy, chemical dependency programming, alternative
programming for lower functioning inmates, transitional programming to prepare
inmates for re-entry into society, aftercare programming for offenders continuing
to serve their sentence, and post-release programming for offenders on supervised
release. Id.
36. Id. The other facilities offering treatment are MCF–Willow River/Moose
Lake for the highest risk male offenders (capacity 50), MCF–Shakopee for adult
women (capacity 12), and MCF–Red Wing for juveniles (capacity 25). Id. at 1-2.
37. Id. at 1.
38. Id.
39. Schlank & Harry, supra note 28, at 1224; see also ASS’N OF STATE CORR.
ADMINISTRATORS’ PUBL’N, CORRECTIONAL BEST PRACTICES: DIRECTORS’ PERSPECTIVES
(2000), http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/Articles/article61.htm (discussing Ohio’s
sex offender treatment program).
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relapse prevention plan involves “a careful analysis of the thoughts,
40
From a
feelings and decisions which preceded past offenses.”
clinical perspective, there is a benefit to encourage or push
offenders to admit to their past offenses despite the offenders’
reluctance to do so, while at the same time giving them
41
psychological support for overcoming their reluctance.
Consequently, an offender who refuses to admit or accept
responsibility for past offenses is declared unamenable to treatment
42
and is not accepted into the treatment program. While admitting
43
past offenses may make sense from a treatment perspective, it may
violate the offender’s Fifth Amendment right against self44
incrimination.
B. Minnesota’s Sentencing Statutes and the Commissioner’s Power to
Extend an Inmate’s Supervised Release Date for Disciplinary Infractions
45

The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated in
1980 with the goal of establishing uniformity and proportionality in
46
criminal sentencing. The Guidelines set a presumptive criminal
40. Schlank & Harry, supra note 28, at 1224 (citing McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S.
24 (2002)).
41. Telephone Interview with Robin Goldman, MCF–Lino Lakes Sex
Offender Treatment Program Director (Oct. 28, 2005). Ms. Goldman likens this
to teaching someone to jump off a high dive. Id. You push them from the top,
but are there at the bottom to offer support and encouragement. Id.
42. See, e.g., State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 791 (Minn.
1999). Morrow is discussed in detail in Part V.A.
43. See Schlank & Harry, supra note 28, at 1224.
44. See infra Part V.
45. The Guidelines were created and are reviewed annually by the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission, an on-going policy-making body created by
the Minnesota Legislature in 1978. See Act of April 15, 1978, ch. 723, 1978 Minn.
Laws 761 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ch. 244 (2004)); see also Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission, What is the Sentencing Guidelines
Commission?, http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/Text%20Only/what_are_the_
guidelines.htm#q2 (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
46. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES pt. I, at 1 (2005). The stated purpose of
the Guidelines is to “establish rational and consistent sentencing standards which
reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that sanctions following conviction of a
felony are proportional to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent
of the offender’s criminal history.” Id. In order to meet this goal, felons convicted
of committing a crime in the typical fashion must receive the same sentence, and
felons convicted of committing a crime in an atypical fashion must receive a
different sentence. Id. Under the previous indeterminate sentencing scheme, the
Legislature set the maximum sentence an inmate could serve based on his crime.
The sentencing judge then had discretion to impose a sentence ranging from
probation to the maximum allowed by the Legislature. Parole boards also had
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sentence based on the type of offense and the convicted felon’s
47
criminal history score.
The offender is rarely incarcerated for the duration of the
sentence.
Instead, the sentence consists of (1) a term of
imprisonment that is equal to two-thirds of the executed sentence,
and (2) a supervised release term that is equal to one-third of the
48
sentence. The supervised release term is a transitional phase that
allows the offender to re-enter society under the supervision of
49
state or county corrections agents. Supervised release may also be
used as an incentive for the offender to behave while incarcerated,
and the Commissioner may impose a “disciplinary confinement
50
period” (also known as “disciplinary confinement time added” or
DCTA) for violation of “any disciplinary rule adopted by the
51
Commissioner.”
When an offender is sentenced, the judge is required to
inform the offender of “(1) the total length of the executed
sentence; (2) the amount of time the defendant will serve in
prison; and (3) the amount of time the defendant will serve on
supervised release, assuming the defendant commits no
disciplinary offense in prison that results in the imposition of a
52
[DCTA].” The judge must also explain that the Commissioner
may extend the defendant’s incarceration time for the commission
of disciplinary offenses which could result in the defendant being
53
incarcerated for the entire sentence.
The Legislature has declared that refusal to participate in sex
54
offender therapy is grounds for DCTA. This means that a sex
discretion to release the inmate if he was deemed rehabilitated. See Richard S.
Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ. 1, 7 (1993). The
Guidelines removed this discretion in favor of a more uniform sentencing
approach. Id.
47. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES pts. II, IV (2005); see also Frase, supra
note 46, at 4.
48. MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 1.
49. See GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON SEX OFFENDER POLICY, FINAL REPORT 9 (2005),
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/commissionsexoffenderpolicy/commissionfinalrepor
t.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
50. MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subd. 1b.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 244.101, subd. 2.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 241.67, subd. 3(a) (“Participation in [the SOTP program] is subject
to the rules and regulations of the Department of Corrections,” i.e., the DOC may
impose DCTA for failure to comply with the program); see also State ex rel. Morrow
v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Minn. 1999).
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offender may be forced to choose between undergoing therapy—
which requires admitting the crime as the first step—or facing
55
DCTA, resulting in a longer period of incarceration. It is this
“Hobson’s choice” that gives rise to a potential violation of the Fifth
56
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
57

A. Brief History of the Right Against Self-Incrimination

Although evidence supporting recognition of the right against
self-incrimination can be found as far back as Talmudic law, the
58
modern-day right has its roots in English history. Following the
Norman conquest of England, separate ecclesiastical courts were
59
established to hear all cases of an ecclesiastical nature. The courts
were inquisitorial, meaning the judge would summon the accused
60
for secret examination.
The oath de veritate dicenda was first introduced to England in
61
1236. It later became known as the oath ex officio because the
62
judge was empowered to compel the oath by virtue of his office.
The ecclesiastical court would force the accused to take the oath,
while he was ignorant of its meaning and before any formal charges
were made, in order to uncover charges that could be leveled

55. See MINN. STAT. §§ 241.67, subd. 3(a), 244.05, subd. 1b(a).
56. The term “Hobson’s choice” means the choice of taking what is offered
or nothing at all. Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 864 (Jean L.
McKechnie ed., 2d ed. 1983).
57. For a much more detailed historical analysis of the right against selfincrimination, see LEVY, supra note 2 and Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored
Relationship Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary
Confession Rule (Part 1), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (1992).
58. LEVY, supra note 2, at 433-35. Levy writes that there was no such thing as a
plea of guilty in Talmudic law. Id. at 435. No one would be permitted to confess
to a crime or witness against himself, and any incriminating admission would
simply be excluded. Id.
59. Id. at 43. The courts had criminal jurisdiction over offenses against
religion such as blasphemy, sacrilege, and witchcraft. They also had jurisdiction
over issues less related to religion, such as sexual conduct, marriage, and wills. Id.
at 43-44.
60. Id. at 45.
61. Id. at 46. It was brought to England by Cardinal Otho, legate of Pope
Gregory IX, as part of procedural reforms to be followed by ecclesiastical courts.
Id.
62. Id.
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63

against him.
It obligated the accused to give true answers to
64
Its purpose was to extract a
whatever questions were asked.
65
confession, and a refusal to take the oath was regarded as
66
Both the King and Parliament
evidence against the accused.
objected to the oath, but the ecclesiastical courts used it
67
nevertheless.
Parliament abolished the oath in the seventeenth century and
common law courts assumed jurisdiction from ecclesiastical courts
68
over matters in which “life, liberty or property” were at stake. In
the years that followed, an affirmative right to remain silent
69
developed. Eventually, English common law recognized the right
against self-incrimination both in court and when interrogated by
70
an agency of the State.
The American colonies adopted England’s right against self71
incrimination. Then, following the Declaration of Independence
in 1776, several states drafted state constitutions containing a right
72
against self-incrimination. Section 8 of the Virginia Declaration of
63. Id. at 46-47.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 47. Obtaining a confession was important because it was often the
only way to comply with the canon law’s requirement of “perfect or complete”
proof. Herman, supra note 57, at 109.
66. Herman, supra note 57, at 112.
67. See id. at 110. In 1246, King Henry III forbade the use of the oath under
most circumstances because he believed it was “contrary to ‘ancient Customs . . .
[and] peoples Liberties.’” Id. In 1285 and again in 1316, Parliament ordered the
courts to desist administering the oath. Id.
68. Id. at 135-36. This action was prompted by the trials of John Lilburne.
Accused of sedition, Lilburne was willing to answer questions about the actual
charges against him, but would not answer questions that he believed raised new
matters. Id. at 135. Lilburne was held in contempt for refusing to take the oath
and was put in the stocks, whipped, fined, and jailed. Id. at 136. He argued that
the oath and self-accusation were against God’s law and the law of nature, and that
he was being imprisoned for refusing to incriminate himself. Id. He gained
popular support, eventually prevailed and was released from jail. Id.
69. See id. at 137-38.
70. Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part 2), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 497,
543 (1992).
71. LEVY, supra note 2, at 336. Virginia, the first American colony, stated in its
1606 charter that its citizens and their descendents would enjoy the same rights as
those born in England. Id. These rights included trial by jury and any criminal
procedural protections that existed in England. Id. Subsequent charters of other
colonies included a similar guarantee. Id.
72. Id. at 409. The states included Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Vermont, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and North Carolina. Id. at
409-10.
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Rights stated that “in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man . . .
73
[cannot] be compelled to give evidence against himself.” This
74
became a model for the Fifth Amendment.
B. The Modern-Day Right Under the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment states that “no [person] shall be
75
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
The right is a bedrock of our society. The right against selfincrimination
reflects . . . our unwillingness to subject those suspected of
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than
an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; . . . our sense of
fair play which dictates “a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the individual alone
until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by
requiring the government in its contest with the
individual to shoulder the entire load”; . . . our distrust of
self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a
76
protection to the innocent.
1.

When the Right Against Self-Incrimination Attaches

In line with the policies listed above, the Fifth Amendment
“privileges [an individual] not to answer official questions put to
him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal,
where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal
77
proceedings.” It applies to any situation where the one asserting
the privilege has a rational fear that his statement could lead to
78
prosecution.
The State may compel a witness to answer if it first grants
73. Id. at 405-06.
74. Id. at 409.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
76. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)
(citations omitted).
77. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
78. See id.; see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (“The
privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which
the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal
proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility
him who gives it.”).
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immunity against use of the answers and evidence derived from
79
If immunity was not
them in any subsequent criminal case.
granted, any compelled answers are not admissible in a later
80
criminal proceeding.
2. The General Requirement that the Right Must Be Affirmatively
Asserted
As a general rule, a person must assert the right against self81
incrimination in order to claim it.
The Fifth Amendment is
intended to protect a witness from government compulsion and
therefore “does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in
82
matters which may incriminate him.” A witness who fails to claim
the right at the time of questioning will not be allowed to claim
83
compulsion at a later date.
3. When the Right Is Self-Executing: Custodial Interrogations and
Penalty Situations
There are, however, certain situations in which the right
becomes self-executing and the witness’ failure to assert the
84
privilege is excused. These situations involve circumstances where
“the individual [was denied] a ‘free choice to admit, to deny, or to
85
An example is found in custodial
refuse to answer.’”
79. Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 78 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972)).
80. Id.
81. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943); see also Garner v. United
States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 (1976) (“[I]n the ordinary case, if a witness under
compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the
government has not ‘compelled’ him to incriminate himself.”)
82. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984).
83. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951); see also United
States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970). In Kordel, a corporate officer who had been
notified of contemplated criminal action against him nevertheless proceeded to
provide incriminating answers to interrogatories posed in a civil case. 397 U.S. at
3-6. The Court concluded that “his failure . . . to assert the constitutional privilege
leaves him in no position to complain now that he was compelled to give testimony
against himself.” Id. at 10.
84. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-30.
85. Garner, 424 U.S. at 657 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241
(1941)). The policy behind the self-incrimination clause being triggered when a
witness fears his answers may lead to criminal charges is that “‘[t]he natural
concern which underlies [these] decisions is that an inability to protect the right
at one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation useless at a later stage.’”
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 638 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1974)). The same policy applies to non-
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86

interrogations.
Coercion is assumed in custodial interrogation
settings because they contain “inherently compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to
87
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”
A penalty situation occurs when a person is forced to decide
between facing a penalty for asserting his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination or avoiding the penalty by incriminating
88
himself. The Supreme Court has stated in a line of cases that a
State may not impose substantial penalties because a witness elects
to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to not give incriminating
89
testimony about himself.
Examples of impermissible penalties
that were substantial enough to trigger the right against self90
incrimination include loss of employment; loss of the license to
91
practice law; ineligibility to receive government contracts,
92
resulting in a reduced ability to earn a living; and loss of ability to
93
hold public office and to participate in political groups. In all of
these cases, the penalties faced by the defendants for refusing to
incriminate themselves were so severe that it caused the defendants
to succumb to the pressure, coercion was assumed, and the right
94
against self-incrimination was self-executing.

criminal proceedings.
86. See, e.g., Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-34.
87. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). Miranda was the first case
to extend Fifth Amendment rights to in-custody interrogation situations. Id.
Miranda recognized inherent compulsion to speak exists when an individual is
interrogated in police custody. Id. Therefore, any statements are presumed to
have been compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment unless the State can
prove that the individual made the statement freely and with full awareness of his
rights. See id. at 478.
88. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434. Failure to assert the right against selfincrimination is also excused “where the assertion of the privilege is penalized so
as to ‘foreclos[e] a free choice to remain silent, and . . . compe[l] . . .
incriminating testimony.’” Id. (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 661
(1976)).
89. See infra notes 90-93.
90. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280
(1968).
91. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
92. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
93. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
94. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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IV. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS RELATING TO SEX
OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMS
A.

Minnesota v. Murphy

In 1980, Donald Murphy was charged with criminal sexual
conduct but was sentenced to three years probation when he
95
pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of false imprisonment. One of
the terms of his probation required participation in sexual
96
offender treatment offered by Alpha House.
After Murphy
abandoned his treatment program, the treatment counselor
informed his probation officer that Murphy admitted raping and
97
murdering a teenage girl in 1974.
Upon meeting with his
98
probation officer, Murphy admitted to the rape and murder. He
99
was arrested and indicted for first-degree murder.
Murphy argued that the use of his confession at trial would
100
violate his Fifth Amendment rights.
The Minnesota Supreme
Court agreed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
issue of “whether a statement made by a probationer to his
probation officer without prior warnings is admissible in a
101
subsequent criminal proceeding.”
The Court ruled that Murphy’s privilege against selfincrimination was not violated because, under the circumstances,
102
he was not compelled to incriminate himself.
However, the
Court stated two principles that have direct bearing on the issue of
sex offenders.
First, a defendant does not lose his Fifth
103
Amendment rights by virtue of conviction of a crime.
Second,
the State threatening to revoke an individual’s probation for
95. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 422 (1984). He was sentenced to a
term of sixteen months, but the sentence was suspended subject to his probation.
Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 423. Murphy had been questioned about the incident twice before
in 1974, but never charged. Id. at 422.
98. Id. at 424.
99. Id. at 424-25.
100. Id. at 425.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 440. Although Murphy was required by the terms of his probation
to answer the probation officer truthfully, that did not preclude him from refusing
to make self-incriminating statements.
Therefore, it would have been
unreasonable for Murphy to believe that invoking his Fifth Amendment rights
would have resulted in his probation being revoked. Id. at 438.
103. Id. at 426; see also Baxter v. Palmigniano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976).
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refusing to incriminate himself would create the classic penalty
situation, and his statements would not be admissible against him
104
at trial.
B.

McKune v. Lile
1.

Facts in McKune
105

the Supreme Court considered the
In McKune v. Lile,
constitutionality of a Kansas law requiring convicted sex offenders
106
Robert Lile was accused of
to complete a treatment program.
sexually assaulting a high school student on her way home from
107
school.
Although he claimed the act was consensual, he was
108
convicted and sentenced to prison.
Prison officials ordered Lile to participate in a Sexual Abuse
Treatment Program (SATP) a few years before his scheduled
109
release date. The two requirements of the program were that he
(1) admit to and accept responsibility for the crime for which he
was convicted and (2) complete a sexual history form detailing all
110
past charged and uncharged criminal offenses.
Although the
information was used primarily to aid rehabilitation, it was not
privileged, and Kansas left open the possibility that the statements
111
would be used in subsequent criminal proceedings.
Prison officials informed Lile that his privilege status would be
reduced from Level III to Level I if he refused to participate in the
112
program.
Some of the benefits a Level III inmate enjoyed
included enhanced visitation rights, the ability to earn up to
minimum wage, the ability to send money home to family, and a

104. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435. “There is thus a substantial basis in our cases for
concluding that if the state, either expressly or by implication, asserts that
invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would have
created the classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be
excused, and the probationer’s answers would be deemed compelled and
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.” Id.
105. 536 U.S. 24 (2002).
106. Id. at 29.
107. Id. at 29-30.
108. Id. at 30. Lile was convicted of rape, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated
kidnapping. Id. The opinion does not state the length of his prison term. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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cell shared with one other inmate rather than four.
Lile argued that being forced to choose between admitting to
sexual assault and having his status reduced to Level I imposed
impermissible penalties upon him and thus violated his Fifth
114
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
The United States
District Court for the District of Kansas entered summary judgment
115
in his favor and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
116
affirmed.
2.

The Plurality and Dissenting Opinions
117

A plurality of the Court ruled that the reduction in status was
118
not a penalty, and therefore Lile’s rights were not violated.
The
plurality based its opinion on the premise that prison officials were
119
The
free to move prisoners to other facilities for any reason.
Court previously ruled that “challenged prison conditions cannot
give rise to a due process violation unless those conditions
constitute ‘atypical and significant hardship[s] on [inmates] in
120
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”
Therefore,
because the Commissioner could move Lile to another prison unit
at will, the Court reasoned that the loss of benefits that
accompanied the move was not a penalty for purposes of self121
incrimination.
113. Id. at 63-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also pointed to the
fact that reduction from Level III to Level I is typically reserved for serious
disciplinary infractions, such as committing a felony, theft, sodomy, arson, and
assault. Id. at 63 n.8.
114. Id. at 31.
115. Lile v. McKune, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1164 (D. Kan. 1998). The court
reasoned that he would subject himself to perjury since he testified at trial that the
act was consensual. Id. at 1157 n.8.
116. Lile v. McKune, 224 F.3d 1175, 1192 (10th Cir. 2000). The court of
appeals ruled that reduction in prison privileges and housing accommodations
was a penalty. Id. at 1189.
117. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion, in which Justices Scalia and Thomas,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. McKune, 536 U.S. 24 at 29. Justice O’Connor
concurred in the result. Id. at 48-54 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 45-46.
119. Id. at 44. Prison administrators are free to transfer inmates to a different
prison even if “life in one prison is much more disagreeable than in another.”
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (discussing Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause).
120. McKune, 536 U.S. at 37 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995)). Although Sandin involves due process violations, the Court stated that
Sandin’s reasoning is analogous to a self-incrimination claim. Id.
121. Id. at 44. Although the defendant, Lile, “would prefer not to choose
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After ruling that there was no constitutional violation, the
plurality was free to balance Kansas’s legitimate interests in
rehabilitating sex offenders with incidental “burdens [on] an
122
inmate’s right to remain silent.” The plurality also reasoned that
the State’s interest in rehabilitation must be “weighed against the
123
exercise of an inmate’s liberty” and an inmate who accepts
124
responsibility for the crime is more likely to be rehabilitated.
Finally, the plurality was concerned that a ruling in favor of Lile
would call the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines into question, because
they allow for downward adjustment of a sentence when the
125
However, while
offender accepts responsibility for the crime.
these are valid concerns, they are subordinate to the Constitution
and would not survive if Kansas’s SATP program had been found
unconstitutional.
The dissent argued vigorously that the SATP program was not
taking away benefits, but was instead penalizing inmates for
126
refusing to incriminate themselves. The dissent also pointed out
that even if the change in Lile’s status could be characterized as a
loss of benefits to which he had no entitlement, the question is not
whether he was entitled to them in the first place, but whether
taking them away now constitutes a penalty for asserting his Fifth
127
Amendment rights.
3.

Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence

Justice O’Connor’s concurrence is the most important part of
the opinion because although she agreed with the plurality’s
outcome, she did not agree with its analysis. She was troubled by its
between losing prison privileges and accepting responsibility for his past crimes,” it
is a choice “that does not amount to compulsion, and therefore one Kansas may
require [Lile] to make.” Id. at 45.
122. Id. at 41.
123. Id. at 36.
124. Id. at 36-37. “Acceptance of responsibility . . . demonstrates that an
offender ‘is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional
system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a
shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.’” Id. (citing Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970)).
125. Id. at 47 (citing section 3E1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
Guidelines Manual).
126. Id. at 64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 66. The dissent pointed out that it took Lile several years to acquire
the living status he enjoyed at the time he was ordered to participate in the SATP
program. Id. at 62.
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“failure to set forth a comprehensive theory of the Fifth
128
More
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”
specifically, Justice O’Connor did not agree that the “atypical and
significant hardship” standard is broad enough to evaluate whether
129
a prisoner has been compelled to incriminate himself.
Instead,
she believes the test should be “whether the pressure imposed . . .
rises to a level where it is likely to ‘compel’ a person ‘to be a witness
130
against himself.’”
Unlike the plurality, Justice O’Connor would apply the
“penalty case” analysis to this situation, which would require
determining whether the consequence faced by the individual
131
refusing to incriminate himself was an impermissible penalty.
O’Connor felt the changes in living conditions Lile faced were too
132
However, she did state that
minor to “compel his testimony.”
longer incarceration is a penalty far greater than those already
found unconstitutional in the penalty cases, and its “imposition . . .
for refusing to incriminate oneself would surely implicate a ‘liberty
133
interest.’”
The Court in McKune did not establish a self-incrimination test
to apply in the prison context because it could not agree that the
change in Lile’s living conditions were severe enough penalties to
trigger the right against self-incrimination. However, if Lile had
faced extended incarceration for refusing to incriminate himself, it
appears that Justice O’Connor would have joined the dissent and
created a majority that would have found it to be an impermissible
134
penalty.
In fact, even the plurality opinion suggested that an
extension of Lile’s incarceration term or ineligibility for good time
135
credits would have affected the analysis.
This is important to
keep in mind when considering Minnesota’s law.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 53 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 49.
See id. at 49-50.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 52.
Id.
See id. at 43.
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V. MINNESOTA CASE LAW RELATING TO SEX OFFENDERS
A.

State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur
1.

Facts of the Case

State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur is Minnesota’s leading case on
the issue of requiring admission of a crime in prison-based therapy.
Randy Morrow was convicted in 1996 of fourth-degree criminal
136
Morrow had
sexual conduct against a thirteen-year-old boy.
employed the boy, and other boys, to assist him with his paper
137
The children spent much time at his house and often
route.
138
spent the night.
Morrow testified at trial that he showed his
affection to the boys by hugging and kissing them and giving them
139
backrubs. The complainant, N.F., testified that on two occasions
140
Morrow touched N.F.’s buttocks, which Morrow denied. The jury
found Morrow guilty and he was sentenced to thirty-six months of
141
imprisonment and ten years of supervised release.
Morrow was committed to the Commissioner of Corrections
and underwent sex offender assessment at the Minnesota
142
Correctional Facility at Stillwater.
The prison psychologist
informed Morrow that the purpose of the interview was to
determine the most appropriate SOTP and that failure to complete
143
the program could result in additional incarceration time.
Morrow cooperated in the interview by discussing and admitting
144
some parts of the offense.
However, he denied touching N.F.’s
145
He also denied
buttocks, the element of sexual contact.

136. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 789.
Minnesota Statutes section 609.345,
subdivision 1(b) (1998) states that a person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in
the fourth degree if they engage in sexual conduct with someone between the ages
of thirteen and sixteen, and are more than forty-eight months older than the
person. Consent is not a defense. Id. Mistake must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id.
137. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 789.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 790.
145. Id.
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146

responsibility for the offense and was unremorseful. Morrow was
transferred to Lino Lakes to begin long-term intensive sex offender
147
treatment.
Morrow was assessed once again at Lino Lakes, where he
admitted to all actions of his offense except for touching N.F.’s
148
buttocks.
Morrow gave three reasons for his denials. First, he
149
denied that his actions were inappropriate, harmful, or criminal.
Second, he refused to admit to the offense because he was in the
process of appealing his conviction and feared that an admission
150
would damage his appeal.
Third, Morrow had testified in his
defense at trial and feared prosecution for perjury if he admitted to
151
the offense.
The treatment staff determined that Morrow would not benefit
152
As a
from treatment and discharged him from the program.
result, Morrow was assessed ninety days DCTA, and his release date
153
was extended from January 22, 1998, to April 22, 1998.
2.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals Decision

The district court denied Morrow’s habeas corpus petition,
154
and he appealed. The court of appeals found significant the fact
155
that Morrow had not exhausted his right to appeal.
The court
stated that “the ‘better rule’ is that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination ‘continues until . . . the
156
conviction has been affirmed on appeal.’”
The court also ruled
that requiring an admission of guilt before being allowed to enter
157
the treatment program was too restrictive.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 790-91. Morrow’s conviction was subsequently affirmed on appeal.
State v. Morrow, No. C4-96-1702, 1997 WL 309453, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 10,
1997). That fact, however, as the court of appeals noted in deciding that Morrow’s
right against self-incrimination was violated, is irrelevant because the appeal was
pending at the time Morrow was being assessed for treatment. See State ex rel.
Morrow v. LaFleur, 577 N.W.2d 226, 228 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
151. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 791.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Morrow, 577 N.W.2d at 227.
155. Id. at 228.
156. Id. at 227 (quoting United States v. Duchi, 944 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir.
1991)).
157. Id. at 228. The court distinguished Morrow’s case from Taylor v. Lieffort,
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The court of appeals stated that Morrow’s termination from
the treatment program made treatment “a punishment for an
exercise of [Morrow’s] rights rather than an opportunity for
158
rehabilitation.” The court also held that imposing DCTA because
Morrow refused to admit guilt before entering the treatment
program resulted in him “being punished immediately and directly
for his failure to (fully) admit guilt” rather than making failure one
factor in the ultimate decision of whether he successfully
159
completed treatment.
The court of appeals ruled that Morrow’s
Fifth Amendment rights were violated and ruled that he must be
160
released on his original release date.
3.

The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision

The Minnesota Supreme Court accepted review on the issue of
“whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
prohibits the Department of Corrections from making a finding of
unamenability to treatment when that finding is based . . . on the
inmate’s assertion that truthful cooperation with treatment could
161
subject him to criminal liability.” The court reversed the court of
162
appeals, holding that Morrow’s rights were not violated.
The court’s analysis focused on whether the Commissioner’s
power to impose disciplinary time on Morrow was a sufficient
compulsion to trigger Morrow’s Fifth Amendment right against
163
self-incrimination.
In doing so, the court focused on the nature
of the compulsion: the choice between participating in mandated
sex offender treatment—which includes admission of the convicted
offense—or having his sentence extended as discipline for failure
568 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), which involved a similar set of
circumstances. There, the court held that a requirement of admission of guilt
before Taylor, an inmate, could be admitted to sex offender treatment did not
violate his Fifth Amendment rights. See Taylor, 568 N.W.2d at 458-59. The court of
appeals, in Morrow, distinguished Taylor on two grounds. First, Taylor had already
exhausted his appeals. Morrow, 577 N.W.2d at 228. Second, Taylor refused to
participate in treatment, but Morrow only refused to make certain admissions. Id.
158. Morrow, 577 N.W.2d at 228.
159. Id. The court cited In re Welfare of J.G.W, 433 N.W.2d 885, 886 (Minn.
1989), for the proposition that while the court could not require someone to
incriminate themselves, it could require treatment for which acceptance of guilt is
necessary for successful completion of therapy. See Morrow, 577 N.W.2d at 228.
160. Morrow, 577 N.W.2d at 228.
161. State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 792 (Minn. 1999).
162. Id. at 796.
163. Id. at 792.
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164

to complete treatment. The court reasoned that this did not rise
to the level of compulsion found in the penalty cases and
165
determined that Morrow’s rights were not violated.
Key to the decision was the court’s distinction between being
released from prison before the end of one’s sentence and “losing
166
one’s freedom when . . . not serving a sentence.”
The court
interpreted Minnesota’s sentencing statutes as not guaranteeing a
167
“specific, minimum length of a supervised release term,” but that
a supervised release date is conditional upon participation in a
168
SOTP. The court wrote:
In the plainest of terms, when Morrow received a 36month
sentence,
those
36
months
belonged
presumptively to the state. Reducing the part of the 36month sentence that is to be spent on supervised release is
not a penalty of such magnitude that it is comparable to
those detailed in the Supreme Court’s so-called “penalty”
169
cases.
Once the court determined that Morrow did not have a
fundamental right to supervised release, it reasoned that society’s
interest in releasing sex offenders in a treated state outweighed
170
Morrow’s interests in refusing to incriminate himself.
In his dissent, Justice Page (joined by Justice Paul Anderson)
argued that Morrow’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated
because he was penalized as a direct result of his refusal to
171
incriminate himself while his appeal was pending.
“The simple
solution to this problem,” he stated, “is for the [S]tate to grant
Morrow immunity for any incriminating statements” that would
172
affect his appeal.

164. Id.
165. See id. at 794-96 & n.13.
166. Id. at 793; see also State v. Kaquatosh, 600 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999).
167. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 793 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 3
(1998)).
168. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 1 (1998)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 795-96. The court also distinguished between invoking one’s Fifth
Amendment right and the State’s ability to require answers to official questions.
Id. at 795.
171. Id. at 796-97 (Page, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 798. This argument is not new. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,
78 (1973); see also supra Part III.B.1.
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B. State v. Kaquatosh
173

State v. Kaquatosh,
decided by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals shortly after Morrow, ruled that the threatened loss of
probation is a sufficient liberty interest to trigger one’s Fifth
174
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Mike Kaquatosh
175
As
was found guilty of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.
part of the pre-sentence investigation, the trial judge ordered
Kaquatosh to submit to an assessment to determine his need for
176
sex-offender treatment.
Kaquatosh went to the assessment, but
denied all of the allegations in the complaint and was deemed
177
unamenable to treatment.
The judge stayed Kaquatosh’s twenty-one year prison sentence
178
and instead put him on probation for ten years.
One condition
of his probation was that he successfully complete a treatment
program and “denial of [the] offenses [was] not acceptable as
reasons why [Kaquatosh was] not accepted into a treatment
179
program.”
180
Kaquatosh initiated an appeal of his conviction. His defense
attorney recommended that he cooperate with the treatment but
assert his Fifth Amendment right when questioned about the facts
181
underlying the conviction.
Kaquatosh followed these
recommendations and agreed to participate in treatment but
182
refused to admit to the crime.
He was again deemed
inappropriate for treatment and was arrested for violating his
183
parole.
At the parole hearing, Kaquatosh argued that his Fifth

173. 600 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
174. Id. at 158. Kaquatosh was decided by the court of appeals and therefore its
value as precedent is much lower than Morrow. Nevertheless, it does illustrate how
Minnesota courts interpret Morrow and Murphy, as well as the uncertainty
surrounding this issue.
175. Id. at 154.
176. Id. at 154-55. The trial court must order convicted sex offenders to
undergo assessment as part of a pre-sentence investigation unless the sentencing
guidelines provide a presumptive prison sentence or an adequate assessment was
conducted prior to the conviction. MINN. STAT. § 609.3457, subd. 1 (2004).
177. Kaquatosh, 600 N.W.2d at 155.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 154.
181. Id. at 155.
182. Id.
183. Id. The treatment provider recommended that he wait until after his
appeal to participate in the program. Id.
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184

Amendment rights were being violated.
The judge rejected the
185
argument and executed the prison sentence.
The court of appeals, relying heavily upon Morrow and Murphy,
186
reversed the decision.
Although the Morrow court ruled that a
delay in Morrow’s supervised release date did not rise to the level of
compulsion necessary to trigger his right against self-incrimination,
the court did state that revocation of probation would be
187
sufficient. Likewise, the Supreme Court in Murphy stated that the
threatened loss of parole would create “the classic penalty
188
situation.” The court of appeals ruled that revoking Kaquatosh’s
probation impermissibly penalized him for asserting his Fifth
189
Amendment rights.
Therefore, the State could not compel
Kaquatosh to incriminate himself as part of the treatment program,
190
and revocation of his probation was unconstitutional.
C. Carrillo v. Fabian
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of Minnesota’s
191
sentencing statutes in Carrillo v. Fabian turns Morrow on its head
by coming to an exactly opposite conclusion regarding an inmate’s
liberty interest in his supervised release date. Richard Carrillo, an
inmate at the Faribault prison serving a 114-month sentence for a
drive-by shooting, was accused of disorderly conduct and assault of
an inmate because a prison guard claimed she saw him shove
192
another inmate to the ground.
The prison guard was the only
witness to testify against Carrillo at his disciplinary hearing, and
although she could not see his face when the altercation occurred,
193
she testified that it was him.
Carrillo and two other inmates

184. Id. at 156. Kaquatosh was willing to participate in treatment but his
defense attorney advised him not to do so. Id. at 155. His predicament is
illustrated in his statement: “So what do I do, jeopardize my Fifth Amendment in
doing this when [the defense attorney] advises me not to? Which road do I take?”
Id. at 156.
185. Id. at 157-58.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 157 (citing State ex rel Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 792-93
(Minn. 1999)).
188. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984)).
189. Id. at 158.
190. Id.
191. 701 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2005).
192. Id. at 766-67.
193. Id. at 767.
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194

testified that he did not commit the offense.
Nevertheless, the
hearing officer, relying on the “some evidence” standard of proof
applied in prison disciplinary hearings, ruled that Carrillo
195
committed the offense.
As a result, Carrillo served twenty-three
days in segregation, and his supervised release date was delayed by
196
seven days.
Carrillo’s writ of habeas corpus was denied by the
197
The Minnesota Supreme
district court and court of appeals.
Court, however, ruled that extending Carrillo’s incarceration
198
violated his right to due process.
The first issue the court decided, and the key issue with respect
to the self-incrimination analysis, was whether Minnesota’s
sentencing scheme creates a liberty interest in an inmate’s
199
supervised release date.
This was essentially the same issue the
court addressed in Morrow, but this time the court came to the
200
opposite conclusion.
Rather than ruling that an inmate’s entire
sentence presumptively belongs to the State, the court ruled that
an inmate has a statutory right to his supervised release date unless
201
he commits an offense while in prison.
202
In Sandin v. Connor, the Supreme Court established the
“nature of the deprivation” test, which looks not at strict statutory
language but “the nature of the deprivation and the extent to
which that deprivation departs from the basic conditions of [the
203
inmate’s] sentence.” With this test in mind, the court considered
Carrillo’s claim with regard to Minnesota’s sentencing system.
The court noted that when Carrillo was sentenced, he was told,
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 244.101, that he would
serve two-thirds of his sentence in prison and the remaining time
194. Id.
195. Id. Minnesota Department of Corrections Policy 303.010, H, requires
only “some evidence in the record to support the charged violation of the
offender disciplinary regulations.” Id.
196. Id. at 768.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 777.
199. Id. at 768.
200. See supra Part V.A.3. Compare Carillo, 701 N.W.2d at 777, with State ex rel
Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 793 (Minn. 1999).
201. Carrillo, 701 N.W.2d at 773.
202. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
203. Carrillo, 701 N.W.2d at 771. Sandin dealt with disciplinary segregation.
The Court ruled that segregation involved only the conditions under which the
inmate served time while in prison and, because it did not “inevitably affect” the
duration of the inmate’s sentence, it was not a departure from the basic conditions
of the sentence. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 475-76, 487.
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on supervised release, but that prison time could be extended if he
204
committed a disciplinary offense. The court reasoned that under
this sentencing scheme, an extension of incarceration is a
departure from the basic conditions of the inmate’s sentence. It
stated:
[I]t is precisely because Minnesota’s statutory scheme sets
up an ordered, standardized, clearly delineated system—
under which an inmate will be released from prison on the
date that he was informed by the judge at sentencing that
he would be released unless he commits a disciplinary
offense—that the extension of Carrillo’s supervised release
date represents a departure from the basic conditions of
205
his sentence.
The court recognized that Minnesota’s sentencing scheme also
contains a provision that declares “[n]otwithstanding the court’s
explanation of the potential length of a defendant’s supervised
release term, the court’s explanation creates no right . . . to any
206
The
specific, minimum length of a supervised release term.”
court reasoned that a literal interpretation of this provision would
allow the Commissioner to extend an inmate’s supervised release
date for any reason whatsoever, thus rendering the previous
207
provisions useless.
To harmonize the provisions, the court
concluded that there is a difference between a “liberty interest” and
208
This interpretation would allow
a “right” to supervised release.
the Commissioner to extend the supervised release date if the
inmate commits a violation, but would guard the inmate against
unjustified extensions by granting him the right to protect his
209
liberty interest in his release date.
The court reversed the appellate court’s decision and
210
The
Carrillo’s original supervised release date was reinstated.
important rule is that “any extension of an inmate’s period of
imprisonment represents a significant departure from the basic
211
conditions of the inmate’s sentence.”
Therefore, under

204. Carrillo, 701 N.W.2d at 771 (citing MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subds. 1-2).
205. Id. at 772 n.6.
206. Id. at 773 (alteration in original) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 3
(2004)).
207. Id. at 773 n.7.
208. Id. at 773.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 777.
211. Id. at 773.
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Minnesota’s sentencing scheme, any disciplinary sanction that “as
an immediate consequence” extends an inmate’s supervised release
date triggers a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the
212
U.S. Constitution.
VI. UNCERTAINTY BREWING IN MINNESOTA’S SEX OFFENDER
TREATMENT PROGRAM
Morrow was based on the “important distinction . . . between
being released from prison earlier than the time ordered in one’s
sentence and losing one’s freedom when one is not serving a
213
sentence.”
Because Morrow’s time “belonged presumptively to
the state,” an extension of his supervised release date could not
214
possibly have been a penalty for purposes of self-incrimination.
But this distinction is contradicted by Carrillo’s recognition of a
215
prisoner’s liberty interest in his supervised release date.
Accordingly, Carrillo leaves Minnesota’s SOTP in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.
A. Distinguishing Between Due Process and Fifth Amendment Violation
Analyses
Morrow and Carrillo were decided on different constitutional
doctrines: Morrow’s under the Fifth Amendment and Carrillo’s
under Due Process. But this does not change Carrillo’s effect on
Minnesota’s treatment program for two reasons.
First, the
difference between governmental actions giving rise to Due Process
violations and government-created penalties triggering the right
against self-incrimination is hazy and, if anything, the Fifth
216
Amendment standard is easier to meet.
According to Justice
212. Id. It is interesting to note that Carrillo was written by Justice Paul H.
Anderson, who had joined Justice Page’s Morrow dissent. Chief Justice Blatz, who
was in the Morrow majority and authored the Carrillo dissent, was the only other
justice to have served on the court during the Morrow decision. Chronological List
of
Justices
and
Judges
of
the
Minnesota
Appellate
Courts,
http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/judges.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2006). It is
likely that the change in the court’s make-up played a role in the different
interpretation of Minnesota’s sentencing statutes.
213. State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 793 (Minn. 1999).
214. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 3 (1998)); see also supra Part V.A.3.
215. See supra Part V.C.
216. For example, the McKune plurality found Sandin’s due process analysis “a
useful instruction” in dealing with the self-incrimination issue. McKune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24, 25 (2002) (citing Sandin v. Connor 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).
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O’Connor, the self-incrimination standard is even easier to
establish because “the Fifth Amendment compulsion standard is
broader than the ‘atypical and significant hardship’ standard we
217
have adopted for evaluating due process claims in prisons.” And
the Morrow majority agreed with Justice Page’s statement that
“[t]he absence of a substantive due process claim does not
necessarily mean that the sanction imposed is not compulsion in
218
Therefore, because
violation of the Fifth Amendment.”
Minnesota’s sentencing scheme created a due process right for
Carrillo, it was surely capable of creating a coercive penalty
situation for Morrow.
Second, both Morrow and Carrillo hinged on the court’s
interpretation of Minnesota’s sentencing scheme, not on different
constitutional claims. In other words, the first hurdle both Morrow
and Carrillo needed to overcome—irrespective of their underlying
constitutional claim—was that Minnesota’s sentencing scheme
granted them an interest in their scheduled supervised release
date.
For example, the court in Morrow focused first on Minnesota’s
sentencing statutes in determining that Morrow did not have an
interest in his supervised release date, thus paving the way for its
decision that Morrow was not being penalized for asserting his Fifth
219
Amendment rights. Likewise, in Carrillo the court stated that the
first step in a due process analysis was to determine whether the
220
State was interfering with an individual’s liberty interest.
This
also meant determining whether Carrillo had a liberty interest in
his supervised release date, which was the same basic question as in
221
Morrow.
Therefore, the fact that the two cases were decided on
different constitutional doctrines does not change Carrillo’s effect
on a sex offender’s right against self-incrimination.
B. Applying McKune and Murphy Through the Carrillo Lens
The constitutional implications of the Carrillo decision on

“[Sandin] may not provide a precise parallel for determining whether there is
compelled self-incrimination, but it does provide useful instruction for answering
the latter inquiry.” Id. at 25.
217. Id. at 48 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484).
218. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 793 n.10, 798 (Page, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 793.
220. Carillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Minn. 2005).
221. Id.
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Minnesota’s SOTP are undeniable. With the court’s recognition of
a liberty interest in an offender’s supervised release date, the State
can no longer rely on Morrow when determining that offenders are
unamenable to treatment simply because they refuse to make
incriminating statements.
As already discussed above, had the court recognized the
liberty interest at the time of Morrow, the decision would almost
certainly have gone the other way; once the court established that
Morrow had no right to a supervised release date, it logically
followed that he was not being impermissibly penalized for his
222
refusal to incriminate himself. If, however, Morrow had a liberty
223
interest in his supervised release date (as recognized in Carrillo )
and his full sentence did not “belong[] presumptively to the
224
State,” then extending his supervised release date would have
been a “substantial penalty for purposes of the Fifth
225
Amendment.”
United States Supreme Court precedent compels the same
conclusion. Although the Court in McKune did not find a Fifth
Amendment violation under the facts of that case, Justice
226
227
O’Connor’s concurrence, the dissent, and even the plurality
228
opinion all state that an extension of incarceration time would be
a penalty sufficient to trigger the right against self-incrimination.
Morrow faced longer incarceration in the form of DCTA for
229
refusing to incriminate himself.
It is quite plausible that under
the McKune reasoning the Supreme Court would have found this to
be an impermissible penalty by itself. However, it is even more
likely that the Supreme Court would find an impermissible penalty
222. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 793; see also supra Part V.A.3.
223. See supra Part V.C.
224. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 793.
225. Id.
226. The penalty of “longer incarceration . . . [is] far greater than those we
have already held to constitute unconstitutional compulsion in the penalty cases.
Indeed, the imposition of such [an] outcome[] as a penalty for refusing to
incriminate oneself would surely implicate a ‘liberty interest.’” McKune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24, 52 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
227. The dissent argued that Lile’s loss of benefits while in prison implicated a
liberty interest. See id. at 54 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Undoubtedly, the dissent
would have agreed that longer incarceration would also implicate a liberty
interest.
228. “In the present case, [Lile’s] decision not to participate in the Kansas
SATP did not extend his term of incarceration. Nor did his decision affect his
eligibility for good-time credits or parole.” Id. at 38.
229. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 791.
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when the State threatens to take away a recognized liberty interest.
The Supreme Court’s rule in Murphy (and the court of
appeals’ decision in Kaquatosh as persuasive authority) supports the
idea that requiring a sex offender to admit his crime violates the
Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court stated in Murphy that
threatened loss of parole is a sufficiently severe penalty to invoke
230
the right against self-incrimination.
Parole is different from a
future supervised release date because the parolee has liberty now,
while the inmate has an interest in future liberty. However, Carrillo
blurs the distinction between the two by recognizing an actual
liberty interest in supervised release. Extending an offender’s
release date prolongs incarceration and is in essence a denial of his
231
future liberty.
Carrillo’s interpretation of Minnesota’s sentencing scheme has
placed Minnesota’s SOTP in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Incarcerated offenders, just like parolees, now have a recognized
232
liberty interest in their supervised release date. The State violates
the Fifth Amendment when it threatens to interfere with either
interest simply because the offender invokes his right against selfincrimination.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Society has an undeniable interest in rehabilitating sex
233
Constitutional
offenders before they are released from prison.
challenges to Minnesota’s SOTP can be minimized and even
eliminated by structuring the program to avoid penalty situations.
Potential solutions include (1) utilizing treatment programs that
do not require admission of the offense, (2) beginning treatment
after all appeals have been exhausted, (3) granting immunity to
statements made in therapy, and (4) changing sentencing laws by
legislative action.

230. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984).
231. The Carrillo court recognized that “seven days of additional incarceration
time may not appear long relative to two-thirds of a 114-month sentence,”
however, “any extension of an inmate’s period of imprisonment represents a
significant departure from the basic conditions of the inmate’s sentence” and is
worthy of the Constitution’s protections. Carillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 773
(Minn. 2005).
232. See id.; see also Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435.
233. See supra Part II.
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A. Utilize Treatment Programs Not Requiring an Admission of Guilt
The conventional view of most therapists is that the offender’s
denial of the crime must be overcome in order for the treatment to
234
be effective,
and most courts believe that acceptance of
235
responsibility is necessary for rehabilitation. There are, however,
alternatives that would allow an offender to participate without first
admitting to the crime.
In one such method, known as “metaconfrontation,” the
therapist “aims to induce eventual acceptance of responsibility by
expressing empathy for the offender’s initial need to deny [the
236
offense].” The program is designed for offenders who are “most
237
vulnerable and dependent on their defenses” and “encourages
the offender to use his strengths to confront his own weaknesses,
238
those parts of him that want to protect and deny.”
A second option, the “Schlank and Shaw method,” was created
“as an intermediary step for offenders who are removed from
traditional treatment programs for absolute refusal to admit
239
responsibility for their behavior.”
The program is designed to
teach offenders about the “protective function of denial and elicit
240
empathy for victims.” The offenders are asked to apply what they
241
learn about denial to someone who is guilty of the same offense.
By doing this, the offender confronts the effects of denial without
242
being required to admit the offense. This method was proven to
be fairly successful when it was used on ten offenders and resulted
243
in five of them admitting to their offense.
Treatment professionals are best equipped to decide what
therapy methods to use. However, given that Minnesota’s SOTP is
open to constitutional attack, it may be worth considering other
solutions other than what is being done today.
Providing
alternative treatment programs for offenders who are unwilling to
234. Kaden, supra note 10, at 367; see also supra notes 39-41 and accompanying
text.
235. Kaden, supra note 10, at 369.
236. Id. at 370.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 370-71.
239. Id. at 371-72. The program is named after its creators, Anita Schlank and
Theodore Shaw. Id. at 371.
240. Id. at 371.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 372.
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admit responsibility for the crime would be the best way to avoid a
penalty situation. The Fifth Amendment violation would be
eliminated.
Furthermore, offenders who are traditionally
considered unamenable to treatment would receive a form of
therapy that they are able to handle. This modification would most
likely result in a larger number of offenders receiving some form of
treatment because in virtually all of the cases discussed above the
offender refused to admit guilt, but did not refuse to participate in
treatment altogether.
B. Begin Treatment After All Appeals Have Been Exhausted
Another solution would be to begin treatment after all avenues
of appeal have been exhausted. Minnesota prison therapists follow
244
this practice today.
This practice avoids some Fifth Amendment
violations because the offender would no longer have a reasonable
fear that his statements would be used against him in a future
245
criminal proceeding related to the convicted offense.
However, an offender who testified in his own defense could
still face charges of perjury as well as charges for previous crimes
246
that have never been charged.
This alone would be enough to
prevent an offender from freely discussing his crimes in therapy,
thus forcing him to decide once more between participating in
therapy and extending his supervised release date.
Furthermore, the appeals process can be lenghty, and there
have been instances in which an offender was forced to choose
247
between pursuing his appeal and participating in therapy.
The
offender would also have to forego any post-conviction remedies
248
For these
that may be available to him beyond the first appeal.
reasons, simply waiting until the time to appeal has passed is not a
desirable alternative.

244. Goldman, supra note 41.
245. See supra Part III.B.1.
246. This was the argument made by Lile and Imlay. See McKune v. Lile, 536
U.S. 24, 55 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979, 983
(Mont. 1991).
247. Goldman, supra note 41.
248. See Imlay, 813 P.2d at 983 (noting that a defendant has the post-conviction
remedies of “motion for new trial (including the opportunity to discover new
evidence), appeal, petition for certiorari, and collateral attack”).
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C. Grant Immunity to Statements Made in Therapy
A grant of immunity promising that incriminating statements
made in therapy will not be used against an offender in a future
criminal proceeding could help eliminate potential Fifth
Amendment issues that exist with the current system of
249
treatment.
But the grant of immunity must be specific and
official to be effective. The Morrow court found no coercion
because the Commissioner did not require a waiver of immunity
from Morrow or insist that Morrow’s statements would be used
250
against him in the future. This type of “gentleman’s agreement”
between the State and the offender is not enough because it is not
251
a guarantee that the statements will not be used in the future.
Prosecutors are hesitant to grant immunity because their
primary goal is to convict sex offenders of their crimes and courts
do not want to tread on the probation rights of the executive
252
branch.
But immunity would not harm the State’s interests if it
does not plan to use the statements in the future. Immunity would
also encourage the offender to accept responsibility and complete
253
the therapy process.
Offering immunity will also further the goal of developing a
254
successful relapse prevention plan.
As discussed above, it is
essential that the offender disclose all past offenses in order to
create a plan based on “the thoughts, feelings and decisions which
255
preceded [the] past offenses.” An offender would be much more
willing to talk openly if there was no fear that his statements would
be used against him in a criminal prosecution.
Immunity, however, would not solve all of the problems. First,
the mere fact of the offender’s participation in the SOTP, even
without his incriminating statements, shows that he admitted to the
crime.
Second, immunity would not keep the offender’s
statements from being used against him in a civil commitment
256
hearing.
The right against self-incrimination only applies to
249. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973); see also supra Part III.B.1.
250. State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Minn. 1999).
251. See Tanabe, supra note 10, at 851-52.
252. Shevlin, supra note 10, at 503.
253. See Schlank & Harry, supra note 28, at 1224.
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 1223-24. “If [the offenders] do not seek treatment in prison, the
government can use this fact against them in a subsequent Sexually Violent Person
(SVP) commitment. If they do seek treatment, the government may use
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future criminal proceedings, and a civil commitment hearing is, by
definition, a civil proceeding. Therefore, although immunity
removes most of the Fifth Amendment violations, it is not ideal
because it would not encourage an offender who feared civil
257
commitment to cooperate with therapy.
D. Legislative Changes to Sex Offender Sentencing Laws
Legislative changes to sex offenders’ sentences are not new.
Guideline sentences for sex offenders have been enhanced a
258
In
number of times since the Guidelines were promulgated.
1989, sentences were doubled and long term supervision was
required for offenders deemed to be “patterned predatory
259
offender[s].”
In 1992, life imprisonment was established for sex
offenders convicted of first-degree sexual assault under certain
260
circumstances. And in 2000, first-degree criminal sexual conduct
offenders were subjected to a presumptive prison sentence of 144
261
months.
The Legislature has the power to create a sentencing scheme
for sex offenders that would remove any potential Fifth
Amendment issues. One option would be to eliminate the
supervised release term for sex offenders. This would avoid the
constitutional issue and would serve society’s interest in keeping
262
the offender off the streets for a longer duration of time.
This
method, however, would cost society more money to imprison the
offender and would remove incentives for the offender to behave
263
while in prison.
The supervised release period is valuable
because it allows the State to monitor the sex offender’s reentry
264
into society. Furthermore, abandoning the sentencing guidelines
information obtained from treatment against the offender in a subsequent SVP
commitment.” Id. (quoting John Q. LaFond, Sexually Violent Predator Laws and
Registration and Community Notification Laws: Policy Analysis: The Costs of Enacting a
Sexual Predator Law, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 468, 496 (1998)); see also Lile v.
McKune, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1157 n.6 (D. Kan. 1998) (recognizing that Lile’s
statements would not be protected in civil commitment proceedings).
257. Schlank & Harry, supra note 28, at 1223.
258. ELLISON, supra note 23, at 2.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Of course, all changes made by the Legislature would have to comport
with constitutional requirements.
263. ELLISON, supra note 23, at 2.
264. FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 15.
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for an entire class of criminals is an extreme step that could create
more problems than it would solve.
There are more preferable options the Legislature can pursue.
For example, in 2004 Governor Pawlenty formed the Governor’s
Commission on Sex Offender Policy to review existing policies and
265
laws and to recommend changes.
The Commission
recommended a number of changes to Minnesota’s sentencing
266
One recommendation is the “[d]evelopment of a
practices.
blended determinate-indeterminate sentencing system for sex
offenders,” involving doubling statutory maximum sentences and
“vigorous . . . reviews of the offender’s response to treatment while
267
in custody.”
If the implementation of this recommendation
resulted in the offender no longer being guaranteed a supervised
268
release date, then the constitutional violation would be removed.
These are just some of the possible solutions. The best
alternative would be to utilize treatment methods that would not
require offenders to admit the offense because the Fifth
Amendment violation would be eliminated and more offenders
would receive treatment. However, if that is not possible, then one
of the other solutions, or perhaps a mix of the solutions, would be
preferable over what is in place today.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Society has a strong interest in rehabilitating sex offenders
before their release from prison. However, as this Note has shown,
Minnesota’s current SOTP likely violates the Fifth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution.
Bringing it in conformity with the
requirements of the Constitution would benefit society greatly by
avoiding constitutional challenges in the future. Furthermore, a
program that complies with the Constitution will allow treatment
providers to focus their efforts on rehabilitation without fear of
265. Id. at 7.
266. Id. at 1-2.
267. Id.
268. Other recommendations from the Final Report include the creation of a
sex offender release board that would have the authority to determine when sex
offenders should be released from prison and their conditions for supervised
release and increasing the maximum sentence to life for sex offenders with a prior
history of criminal sexual conduct. Id. The recommendation to create a sex
offender release board would most likely not avoid the constitutional problems
highlighted in Murphy and Kaquatosh if refusal to incriminate oneself resulted in
revocation of parole. See discussion supra Parts IV.A, V.B.
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269

violating the Fifth Amendment.
But most importantly, a system that encourages people to
incriminate themselves and penalizes them for refusing to do so
should not be allowed to survive. As Justice Stevens wrote in his
McKune dissent, “we ought to ask ourselves—what if this is one of
those rare cases in which the jury made a mistake and he is actually
270
innocent?”

269. This Note does not discount the importance of rehabilitation and the
work done by therapists. Rather, its goal is to point out the inherent problems
with the system with the goal of finding a solution that will avoid the selfincrimination problem and allow the therapists to focus on rehabilitating
offenders.
270. 536 U.S. 24, 71-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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